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Replication is a critical step in the scientific process. This paper is an effort to contribute to the 
growing literature on the replication of Agent-Based Computational Models.  We present a 
replication of Kollman, Miller & Page’s (1997) model of Tiebout sorting.  In that model, 
individual agents with heterogeneous preferences for government policies select among 
jurisdictions that offer the most satisfactory package of government services.  This project makes 
four contributions to the literature. First, our successful replication provides the research 
community with a modernized version of that seminal model.  Second, we confirm that earlier 
results with respect to the single jurisdiction setting are highly robust with respect to voter 
preferences, while the results for multiple jurisdiction settings are sensitive.  Third, we find little 
evidence to suggest that any of the alternative voting rules we consider achieve greater voter 
satisfaction or improve the competitiveness of local elections.  Finally, we demonstrate a 
technique for conducting sensitivity analyses that leverages a high-dimensional experimental 
design.   
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I.  Introduction 
 
 Replication is a critical step in the scientific process. It confirms earlier findings and 
identifies exceptions to those findings.  While Agent-Based Computational Models have grown 
in popularity in recent years, the effort to replicate the results of earlier researchers has grown 
only slowly.  Axtel, et al (1996) are generally credited with the first attempt to dock two different 
simulation models, while Hales, Rouchier, and Edmunds (2003) report the results of a model-to-
model workshop, the intent of which was to encourage the replication of computational models.  
Wilensky and Rand (2007) argue that replication is even more important for computational 
models, because it “increases our confidence in the model verification, leads to a reexamination 
of the original validation of the model, and at the same time, facilitates a common language and 
understanding among modelers.”   See Sansores and Pavon (2005), North and Macal (2009), and 
Zhong and Kim (2010) for relatively recent examples of efforts to replicate computational 
models, while Miodownik, Cartrite, and Bhavnani (2010) extend and build upon a previously 
developed agent-based model that examines civic traditions in Italy.   
This paper is an effort to contribute to this growing literature.  We present a replication of 
Kollman, Miller & Page’s (1997) model of Tiebout sorting (hereafter KMP).  In that model, 
individual agents with heterogeneous preferences for government policies select among 
jurisdictions that offer the most satisfactory package of government services.  We replicate the 
model in Java using the Recursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit (REPAST)1. We then 
extend the analysis along a number of margins.  First, we determine how sensitive the results in 
KMP (1997) are to a wider array of types of voter preferences.  We also employ additional 
voting institutions, including several non-standard voting rules, and consider additional measures 
of effectiveness in an effort to measure whether certain institutions facilitate more intense 
1For more information on REPAST, see: http://repast.sourceforge.net. 
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competition between political parties than others.  Finally, we borrow from the operations 
research literature on data farming and employ a high-dimensional experimental design in 
support of a thorough sensitivity analysis.   
 This project makes four contributions to the literature. First, we build a replication of 
KMP97 that achieves acceptable relational alignment overall, and distributional equivalence in 
certain aspects, thus providing the research community with a modernized version of that 
seminal model.  Second, we find that KMP’s results with respect to the single jurisdiction setting 
are highly robust with respect to voter preferences, while their results for multiple jurisdiction 
settings are sensitive to variations.  Third, our examination of alternative voting rules finds that, 
in this particular context, there is little evidence to suggest that any of the rules considered are 
more efficient with respect to achieving greater voter satisfaction or improving the 
competitiveness of local elections.  Finally, we demonstrate a technique for conducting 
sensitivity analysis that leverages a high-dimensional experimental design.   
 
II.  The Tiebout Hypothesis 
A vast literature exists that examines the ability of local governments to provide public 
goods efficiently.  However, most of the literature overlooks the differential effects of the 
collective choice institutions.  In addition, the distribution of voter preferences may enhance or 
hinder the performance of political institutions.  The dynamics between political institutions and 
voter preferences may greatly affect a local government’s ability to leverage its monopoly 
position in order to extract rents from the constituencies. 
In his seminal paper, Tiebout (1956) argues that, given certain assumptions, local 
governments provide a supply of public goods that approaches the competitive level.  “If 
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consumer-voters are fully mobile, the appropriate local governments, whose revenue-expenditure 
patterns are set, are adopted by the consumer-voters” (1956: 424).  Because local governments 
offer a variety of services and service levels, and constituents “vote with their feet”, local 
governments’ production of public goods will approach the efficient level.  Local governments 
that succeed in providing those public goods that consumer-voters demand tend to be rewarded 
with new constituents (taxpayers) and those that fail tend to be faced with declining populations.  
Some of the assumptions upon which Tiebout relies include (1) consumer-voters are fully mobile 
and can move freely; (2) consumer-voters have full knowledge; (3) large number of 
communities; (4) restrictions due to employment are neglected; and (5) public services exhibit no 
externalities upon other jurisdictions (1956: 419). 
In short, the Tiebout hypothesis states that voters will move to localities that offer that 
package of government services and taxation that fits their preferences.  The present paper 
examines the extent to which Tiebout’s conclusion holds, given a somewhat richer model that 
relaxes several of his assumptions – namely, those pertaining to the knowledge levels of local 
politicians and their abilities and incentives to compete politically for the favor of constituents. 
Epple and Zelenitz (1981) conclude that given fixed jurisdictional boundaries, 
competition among jurisdictions alone does not prevent local governments from leveraging their 
monopoly power.  Mileszkowski and Zodrow (1989) find that under certain circumstances the 
property tax approximates the non-distortionary head tax implied in Tiebout’s model.  The 
authors contrast this with an alternative view that capital bears the average burden of the tax 
(1989: 1141).  They conclude that the latter view prevails under more plausible circumstances.  
Arnott and Stiglitz (1979) consider the role of Georgist taxation of land rents and find that given 
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certain assumptions, differential land rents provide the optimal revenue for public goods.  For a 
survey of the empirical literature, see Dowding, et al (1994).   
In a critique of the theory underlying Tiebout’s model, Bewley (1981) demonstrates in a 
series of examples that Tiebout’s hypothesis does not possess the same qualities as general 
equilibrium.  Under a wide range of assumptions, there exist equilibria that are not Pareto 
efficient.  He argues that the assumptions that form the foundation for Tiebout’s analysis are 
overly restrictive and essentially change public goods into private (1981: 713).  The author 
concludes that the only way to ensure that Tiebout holds is if there are as many jurisdictions as 
there are voters.  The models we develop and analyze in this paper are capable of examining the 
relationship between number of voters and number of jurisdictions. 
 More recent contributions to the literature include Nechyba (1997), who uses a 
simulation model to examine the interplay between state and local governments, in an 
environment of economic and political competition.  Caplan (2001) formulates a model that 
shows that Tiebout competition is unable to reduce the monopoly power of local governments at 
all, due to the presence of tax capitalization which makes it impossible for land owners to move 
to avoid monopolistic pricing of government services (2001: 1-5).  His model leverages an 
exogenous party preference term that characterizes voters’ willingness to trade utility in order to 
see their preferred party in power, which the parties then exploit once in power.  Along those 
lines, the present paper measures the effectiveness with which different voting rules allow for an 
endogenous level of separation between parties to emerge, which incumbent parties could then 
exploit. 
 A local government that is able to shield itself from the competitive process of constantly 
offering the mix of services and taxes that most satisfies voters’ demands for governance would 
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be able to exercise a certain amount of monopoly power to extract rents from its constituents.  As 
in market transactions, firms that face stiff competition must constantly innovate and strive to 
please customers, while firms that enjoy a monopoly position are not necessarily under the same 
constraints.  It is difficult even in a computational model to measure the amount of competition 
between the parties within jurisdictions, a surrogate of platform separation is developed later in 
this paper.  The key characteristic is that this phenomenon emerges endogenously. 
 
III.  The KMP97 Model 
In KMP (1997), the authors develop a computational model to measure the ability of 
different voting institutions to sort individuals who possess preferences over the allocation of 
public goods into different jurisdictions.  (We refer hereafter to the model as KMP97.)  
Heterogeneous agents are endowed with fixed, linearly separable preferences over a specified 
number of binary issues.  Agents reside in one of a fixed number of jurisdictions, within which 
political platforms are determined by collective choice using one of the following institutions: 
democratic referendum, direct competition, or proportional representation.  Jurisdictions select 
their platforms and resolve the collective choice problem regarding the issues, and agents are 
then free to move to the jurisdiction that offers them the highest expected utility.  Agents are 
unable to forecast the effects that their presence will have on the platforms selected in 
jurisdictions to which they may move, which is a key aspect of their bounded rationality.  
 One of the authors’ overarching conclusions is the process through which the agents seek 
their optimal jurisdiction, and through which the imperfectly informed parties pursue the election 
winning platform, is significantly more stable than McElvey (1976) findings would suggest.  In 
addition, they find that the order of how well political institutions perform relative to one another 
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(in terms of increasing aggregate utility) in a single jurisdiction setting is generally opposite of 
how they perform in a multiple jurisdiction setting.  Namely, democratic referendum, an 
institution that provides highly stable outcomes is found to be superior to the other collective 
choice mechanisms in a single jurisdiction model, followed by direct competition and 
proportional representation.  When the number of jurisdictions is increased, proportional 
representation is found to outperform the others.  In fact, as the number of jurisdictions increase, 
so too does the relative ability of proportional representation to sort voters according to their 
preferences (KMP, 1997).  This relationship is due to the propensity for unstable political 
outcomes under proportional representation and direct competition, thus allowing jurisdictions to 
“break out” of sub-optimal equilibria, with greater regularity than democratic referendum.   
 
A. Institutions and Hill-Climbing Parties 
KMP consider the following voting institutions: 
Democratic Referendum.  A democratic referendum involves a simple majority rule vote 
on each issue.  The outcome is the median level for each issue in the jurisdiction.  This is the 
only institution examined that does not involve party participation. 
Direct competition.  Direct competition is a plurality contest between parties.  Agents 
vote for the party proposing the platform that yields them the highest utility and the jurisdiction 
wholly adopts the winning party’s platform.  
Proportional Representation.  Under a proportional representation regime, each voter 
votes for the party proposing the platform that yields her the highest utility.  Each party is then 
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allocated “seats” according to the proportion of votes received.2  The parties then vote separately 
and sincerely on each issue in a democratic referendum. 
 For political institutions that involve the participation of parties, such as direct 
competition and proportional representation, a given number of parties compete within each 
jurisdiction during the electoral process.  They stand separate and distinct from the voting 
populace and lack complete information regarding the preferences of voters within the 
constituency.  They gradually adapt their platform by employing various search mechanisms in 
an attempt to find the platform that will garner the most votes in the election.  The parties seek 
only reelection, and have no policy preferences of their own.  The adaptive technique primarily 
used by the parties in the present paper is known as the hill-climbing heuristic procedure.  Hill-
climbing is intended to simulate those parties that “fine-tune the policy positions of its candidate 
using polling and focus groups” (KMP, 1998: 144).3 
For the hill-climbing algorithm, the party randomly selects no more than three issues of 
its current platform to perturb, in order to constrain the new platform to the neighborhood of the 
original.  The party then conducts a poll over the entire constituency of the jurisdiction and 
determines if the platform will yield it a higher vote total than its current platform.  If so, then the 
new platform becomes the party’s platform, if not, the current platform remains.  This process 
continues for eight iterations, at such time the next party is allowed to adapt its platform.  Once 
all parties have adapted their platforms, another round of adaptation may occur.  For the results 
presented in the following section, each party was allowed 5 rounds of adaptations, which means 
that each party considers a total of 8*5 candidate platforms during every election cycle.  At the 
2 There is no minimum threshold of votes that parties must receive before attaining notional seats in this model. 
3 Though we do not present the results, we replicate the “random” party search as well.   
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conclusion of the campaign the general election is held where the parties run on their newly 
adapted platform.  
 
B.  Notation and Measures of Effectiveness 
The following is a formal specification of the KMP97 model, the notation for which is 
drawn from KMP (1997, 1998).  Let Na agents select among Nj different jurisdictions.  In each 
jurisdiction, a total of Ni issues are resolved collectively. Let pji ∈ {Yes , No} give the position 
of jurisdiction j on issue i.  When political parties are considered, let  prji ∈ {Yes, No} give the 
position of party r in jurisdiction j on issue i.  Let Platform Pj ∈ {Yes, No}Ni denote the vector of 
decisions across all Ni issues in jurisdiction j. Jurisdictions take binary positions on each issue, 
thus we think of such positions as the presence or absence of a particular public good, policy, or 
regulation.   
 Let νai ~ Uniform[-400/Ni, 400/Ni] and give agent a’s utility for issue i.  Furthermore, 
agent a’s utility from platform Pj is given by: 
          
ua(Pj) = Σ νai ∙ δ(pji)    (1) 
 
 
where δ(Yes) = 1, and δ(No) = 0.  An agent’s ideal platform will yield an expected value of 100, 
while the expected utility of a random platform is zero (KMP, 1997). 
 For the replication process, we consider three outputs as measures of effectiveness.  The 
first is per-capita utility, which is simply the mean utility of all agents in the population.  In 
addition to the influence of political institution, per-capita utility tends to increase with the 
number of jurisdictions and increase with the number of parties. 
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 The second measure we examine is the number of agent relocations during a simulation 
run.  An agent executes a relocation whenever it changes jurisdictions.  If a particular voting 
institution tends to encourage a large number of voters to relocate to different jurisdictions, this 
could be beneficial for a number of reasons.  A relatively high number of moves can be 
indicative of instability, which, if it happens early in the simulation could facilitate the sorting of 
voters into homogeneous constituencies that achieve high average utility.   
 We also look at a measure of inter-jurisdiction distance.  The inter-jurisdiction distance 
between the platforms of two jurisdictions is equal to the number of issues for which policies 
differ, divided by the total number of issues (KMP, 1997: 989).  We examine the mean inter-
jurisdiction distance, which simply takes the mean of all pair-wise combinations in a given 
scenario. 
 
III.  A Successful Replication of KMP97 
Wilensky and Rand (2007) describe six margins along which an original model and 
subsequent model may differ.  They are: time, hardware, languages, toolikits, algorithms, and 
authors.  Approximately sixteen years separates the creation of the two models by different 
authors.  That fact, coupled with the fact that the current model is implemented in Java using the 
REPAST libraries, tools that did not exist when KMP developed their model, means that the two 
models differ in hardware, languages, and toolkits.  We attempt to recreate the algorithms as 
faithfully as possible from their descriptions in the referenced works.   
 






Table 1 outlines additional details of the replication effort.  We successfully achieve 
distributional equivalence and/or relational alignment along a number of margins, which we 
expound upon below.  In addition, while in this section we only consider the parameter space 
that KMP examine in their 1997 paper, in subsequent sections we dramatically expand the 
parameter space and conduct a thorough sensitivity analysis of their results.  Finally, it is a 
testament to KMP’s scholarship and clarity of exposition that the current author is able to 
develop a replication of their model with no contact with the authors or with the original model 
in any form.   
 
A.  Replication Assessment 
 In this section, we compare the results of experiments with the present model to KMP’s 
findings regarding similar experiments.  Wherever possible, we choose parameter values the 
same as presented by KMP.  As in that paper, all scenarios presented involve 1000 agents with 
preferences on 11 binary issues and 10 election cycles per run.  In keeping with KMP, we 
replicate each design point 200 times.    
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We employ common random numbers in each scenario in a further effort to reduce 
variance between the estimates and enhance comparative ability (Law and Kelton, 2000).  The 
random number generators that produce the agent’s preferences and initial locations are 
“restarted” at the same point in the psuedo-random number sequence for each scenario.  Thus, 
we test every scenario against the same sets of agents, and for those scenarios with equal 
numbers of jurisdictions, the agents start out in the same place each run.  For instance, the agents 
in replication r of the scenario examining direct competition with two parties and three 
jurisdictions are the exact same agents (same preferences and starting locations) as those in 
replication r of the scenario examining democratic referenda with three jurisdictions.  The agents 
in replication r of say, proportional representation with eleven jurisdictions are the same agents 
(same preferences) but obviously do not start out in the same jurisdictions as the previous two 
examples.  As for the adaptive parties, they start out in the same places at the beginning of the 
runs, but common random numbers cannot be guaranteed throughout the party adaptation 
process, so we achieve only partial commonality.   
 
1.  Single Jurisdiction Per-Capita Utility 
The results for the single jurisdiction model are shown in Table 2, as are KMP’s findings 
for the same scenarios. In general, the model performs substantially similar to the KMP model.  
First, as in the KMP model, all estimates of per-capita utility differ significantly from zero4.  
More importantly, the relative ranks of the decision rules are nearly identical.  The only 
difference in this regard is that for the present model, three-party proportional representation 
achieves greater per-capita utility than seven-party proportional representation, though the 
difference in not statistically significant.  Thus, we sufficiently achieve relational alignment. 
4 Zero is the expected value to an agent of a “random” platform.   
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 Table 2.  Comparison of results of single jurisdiction models (200 replications each).  Null 




 In fact, the model nearly achieves complete distributional equivalence.  For each 
institution, we test the hypothesis that the mean per-capita utility estimates for both models are 
identical using a t-test with unequal variances (Hayter, 2007: 397).  We find that the present 
model’s output only differs significantly from that of KMP97 for democratic referenda and two-
party direct competition.   
 
2.  Multiple Jurisdiction Per-Capita Utility 
The results of the multiple jurisdiction scenarios are shown in Table 3, along with KMP’s 
corresponding findings. As with the single jurisdiction configuration, the model output matches 
the KMP output well.  The output for each decision rule differs significantly from zero, and the 
relative rank of each rule is nearly identical, thereby achieving (near) relational alignment.  The 
only discrepancy occurs in the case of three jurisdictions, in which direct competition achieves 
greater per-capita utility than democratic referenda.  For each jurisdiction, the present model 
estimates that proportional representation with three parties is superior to either democratic 
Per capita Per capita
Utility (s.e.) Utility (s.e.) difference p.value
Democratic referenda 2.69 0.12 2.32 0.10 0.37 0.02 **
Direct competition (2 parties) 1.45 0.13 1.81 0.11 -0.36 0.03 **
Direct competition (3 parties) 0.67 0.13 0.54 0.11 0.13 0.47
Direct competition (7 parties) 0.33 0.13 0.35 0.12 -0.02 0.92
Proportional representation (3 parties) 1.33 0.13 1.48 0.11 -0.15 0.39




referenda or direct competition just like the KMP97 model5.  While the KMP model shows that 
the performance of direct competition improves relative to that of democratic referenda as the 
number of jurisdictions increases, the present model’s estimates for the performance of these two 
institutions cannot be distinguished below a 0.1 level of significance.   
 
Table 3.  Comparison of results of multiple jurisdiction models (200 replications each).  Null 




For each decision rule, we test the hypothesis that the mean per-capita utility estimates 
for both models are identical. The present model achieves distributional equivalence with the 
KMP model for direct competition in the three jurisdiction setting, as well as for democratic 
referenda in the seven and eleven jurisdiction settings.   
 
3.  Inter-Jurisdiction Distance 
 The results for inter-jurisdiction distance are less straightforward, as Table 4 illustrates.  
We are able to achieve distributional equivalence for all scenarios involving proportional 
5 We use a two-sample t test and find the p-values are all extremely small. 
 
Per capita Per capita
3 Jurisdictions Utility (s.e.) Utility (s.e.) difference p.value
Democratic referenda 34.39 0.15 33.78 0.16 0.61 0.01 **
Direct competition (2 parties) 34.15 0.14 33.93 0.14 0.22 0.27
Proportional representation (3 parties) 35.56 0.11 34.42 0.13 1.14 0.00 **
7 Jurisdictions
Democratic referenda 48.29 0.13 48.18 0.12 0.11 0.55
Direct competition (2 parties) 49.90 0.13 48.84 0.13 1.06 0.00 **
Proportional representation (3 parties) 51.80 0.12 50.45 0.12 1.35 0.00 **
11 Jurisdictions
Democratic referenda 55.46 0.12 55.34 0.11 0.11 0.47
Direct competition (2 parties) 57.03 0.13 55.55 0.14 1.87 0.00 **
Proportional representation (3 parties) 58.93 0.12 57.34 0.10 1.89 0.00 **
KMP SeagrenMultiple Jurisdictions
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representation and democratic referenda with seven jurisdictions is borderline.  However, it 
appears that our model has trouble replicating KMP’s results for direct competition.  In fact, we 
are unable to achieve complete relational alignment when it comes to the performance of direct 
competition. 
 
Table 4.  Comparison of results of multiple jurisdiction models (50 replications each).  Null 
hypothesis is that there is no difference between the model outputs of inter-jurisdiction distance. 
 
 
4.  Agent Relocations 
The final response variable we consider is the aggregate number of agent relocations 
during a simulation run, as indicated in Table 5.  In this case we achieve distributional 
equivalence for all scenarios involving democratic referenda, as well as proportional 
representation in three jurisdictions.  However, we again fail to achieve even relational alignment 




3 Jurisdictions Distance (s.e.) Distance (s.e.) difference p.value
Democratic Referenda 61.58 0.84 59.39 0.93 2.19 0.03**
Direct Competition (2 parties) 65.21 0.41 66.42 0.17 -1.21 0.00**
Proportional Representation (3 parties) 66.67 0.36 66.42 0.17 0.25 0.32
7 Jurisdictions
Democratic Referenda 51.64 0.32 50.86 0.35 0.78 0.05
Direct Competition (2 parties) 53.96 0.23 56.02 0.12 -2.06 0.00**
Proportional Representation (3 parties) 56.12 0.15 56.17 0.13 -0.05 0.72
11 Jurisdictions
Democratic Referenda 50.76 0.23 50.16 0.25 0.60 0.03**
Direct Competition (2 parties) 52.26 0.13 53.65 0.09 -1.39 0.00**
Proportional Representation (3 parties) 53.32 0.09 53.34 0.10 -0.02 0.88
Multiple Jurisdictions KMP Seagren
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Table 5.  Comparison of results of multiple jurisdiction models (50 replications each).  Null 
hypothesis is that there is no difference between the model outputs average relocations. 
 
 
B.  Replication Summary 
In summary, we succeed in the effort to replicate the KMP97 model.  With regard to per-
capita utility, the replication achieves near complete relational alignment, and even achieves 
distributional equivalence in many instances.  The replication performs adequately for inter-
jurisdiction distance and agent relocations, achieving distributional equivalence for certain cases 
as well.  However, we identify a potential difference in the implementation of direct competition, 
particularly in terms of these latter measures of effectiveness. 
The manner in which the current model implements direct competition tends to result in 
slightly lower per-capita utility, greater inter-jurisdiction separation, and as a higher number of 
agent relocations, relative to KMP97.  It is possible that the hill-climbing algorithm, as 
implemented, differs in some manner from that implemented in KMP97.  However, the fact that 
the scenarios that involve three or more parties commonly achieve distributional equivalence 
coupled with the fact that the current model closely replicates the most important results 
Agent Agent
3 Jurisdictions Relocations (s.e.) Relocations (s.e.) difference p.value
Democratic Referenda 864.2 17.24 830.2 21.79 33.96 0.15
Direct Competition (2 parties) 915.7 14.67 1626.6 30.00 -710.92 0.00**
Proportional Representation (3 parties) 1277.6 34.41 1263.4 24.21 14.20 0.63
7 Jurisdictions
Democratic Referenda 863.2 10.41 877.2 12.91 -14.00 0.32
Direct Competition (2 parties) 1162.5 8.63 2222.8 29.93 -1060.32 0.00**
Proportional Representation (3 parties) 1371.1 25.75 1632.0 31.67 -260.96 0.00**
11 Jurisdictions
Democratic Referenda 887.3 5.26 901.4 7.07 -14.06 0.06
Direct Competition (2 parties) 1293.7 7.13 2545.7 21.82 -1251.98 0.00**
Proportional Representation (3 parties) 1420.3 21.74 1666.5 25.66 -246.18 0.00**
Multiple Jurisdictions KMP Seagren
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concerning per-capita utility, mitigates any apprehension on this matter and justifies the 
conclusion that the current model tolerably replicates KMP97. 
 
IV. Development and Analysis of the Extended Model 
In this section, we extend the model along two margins.  First, we implement the 
preference landscapes described in KMP (1998), and we consider additional voting institutions.  
We also consider additional measures of effectiveness.   
In KMP (1998), the authors examine the behavior of adaptive parties who seek electoral 
victory by evolutionarily changing their platforms in the hopes of increasing their success at the 
ballot box.  However, they compare party performance given constituencies with significantly 
more complex preferences.  The voters in this model possess an ideal level of government for 
each issue, as well as a separate strength of that preference.  The authors test a number of 
different combinations of voter ideologies and types of strength distributions.  The intensities of 
their preferences may be independent, centrist, or extremist, and the intensities voters possess for 
each issue are either uncorrelated, more heavily weighted towards moderate preferences, or more 
heavily weighted towards extreme ideal points. 
 
A.  Model Formulation and Description 
The notation for this model is identical to that in Section IIIB above, with the exception 
of the policy space and the manner in which agents’ preferences regarding various policy levels 
are modeled.  Let pji ∈ {0 , R} give the position of jurisdiction j on issue i.  The positions may be 
integers between 0 and R.  When political parties are considered, let  prji ∈ {0, R} give the 
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position of party r in jurisdiction j on issue i.  Let Platform Pj ∈ {0, R}Ni denote the vector of 
decisions across all Ni issues in jurisdiction j. 
An agent possesses ideal point for issue i, dai, selected from the closed set {0, R}, where 
the parameter R is the maximum range for ideal points.  Each ideal point has an associated 
intensity level, sai that is selected from the closed set {0,S}.  Agents possess ideal points and 
intensities for each of the Ni issues under consideration.  The results presented later in Section 
IIIE are for scenarios involving 10 issues under consideration, agents’ ideal points are in the set 
[0, 8], and agent’s intensities are drawn from the set [0, 2].   
An agent’s utility is the negative of the squared weighted Euclidean distance between the 
agent’s ideal platform and the given platform, where the weights are the agent’s strengths on 
each issue (KMP, 1998: 143).   
 
  Ua(Pj) = - ∑ sai (  pji – dai )2     (2) 
Agents possess complete information regarding the level of government services offered in all 
jurisdictions.  They move costlessly to the jurisdiction whose platform offers them the highest 
utility, without any expectation regarding the effect they may have on political outcomes in their 
prospective jurisdiction.  External effects between issues are neglected so voters are assumed to 
vote sincerely. 
 
B.  Preference Landscapes 
As in KMP97, agents possess a set of ideal points, which characterize its desired levels of 
government service for each issue, and possess a corresponding set of strengths which 
characterizes the relative importance of each issue to the voter (KMP, 1998: 143).  The agents’ 
preferences remain constant throughout the simulation, however, they may be correlated in two 
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ways.  Individual voter ideal points may be correlated on different issues, and individuals’ 
strengths may be correlated to their ideal points.   
Ideology is term used to describe the manner in which voters’ ideal points are correlated 
(KMP 1998:145).  An individual voter may have consistent or uniform ideology.  A voter with 
consistent ideology has ideal points that are correlated across issues, with a bias towards a 
particular part of the issue spectrum.  These ideal points are generated such that a bias point is 
selected which constrains all ideal points to within plus or minus one unit.  For instance, if the 
bias point generated for a given agent is 2, then his ideal points for each issue must be an integer 
from the closed set [1, 3].  The ideal points for agents with uniform ideology are drawn from a 
uniform random distribution with no such biases. 
An individual agent’s ideal points and strengths may be correlated in one of three 
manners.  Centrist strengths are higher for ideal points that are closer to the middle of the 
distribution.  Suppose ideal points are distributed between 0 and 6.  Then for centrists, the 
maximum strength for an issue will be given to ideal points of 3.  The strength for an ideal point 
of 2 will be higher than the strength associated with an ideal point of 1, and so on.  Extremist 
strengths are higher for ideal points that are closer to the extremes.  So, in the previous example, 
ideal points of 3 would have 0 strength, while ideal points of 0 or 6 would be assigned the 
highest strengths.  Independent strengths are randomly and independently distributed so that on 









Combining ideologies and strength distributions yields six potential electoral landscapes 
of preferences, as shown in Table 6.  These categories are neither exhaustive nor intended to fit 
actual particular distributions of preferences.  They represent polar cases on which to test the 
performance of political institutions.  They do, however, tend to generally correspond to ways in 
which preferences may be distributed once people decide how to vote. Individuals often feel 
strongly about divisive issues with relatively polar alternatives such as abortion or gun control.  
While for other issues, voters may prefer positions far outside the mainstream, but not attach 
much weight to them.   
KMP (1998) show that the electoral landscape formed by voter preferences with respect 
to the incumbent party’s platform varies in terms of ruggedness and slope.  Ruggedness is a 
measure of the relative number of local extrema, while slope is a measure of the magnitude of 
those extrema.  Voters with uniform preferences (i.e. randomly drawn and unbiased) with 
independent intensities (i.e. uncorrelated strengths of opinion) tend to form landscapes that are 
the most rugged (1998:153).  Rugged landscapes hinder the ability of the challenger to locate the 
global optimum that may defeat the incumbent.  Consistent preferences with centrist intensities 
(i.e. biased towards the middle of the spectrum) seem to result in less rugged landscapes which 
enables party’s to quickly converge toward the neighborhood of the median.  The present paper 
tests the robustness of KMP’s Tiebout sorting against a number of varied electoral landscapes. 
Types of ideologies Types of strength distributions
Uniform Independent 
(random distributions of ideal points) (random distribution of strengths)
Centrist 
Consistent (moderate ideal points are weighted)
(correlated ideal points) Extremist
(extreme ideal points are weighted)
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C.  The Political Institutions 
In addition to the institutions considered in the above sections, we examine the following 
collective decision making institutions: 
Borda Count.  In the Borda count, voters rank the candidate parties from 1 (their favorite) 
to m, where m is the number of candidates.  The votes for each candidate are tallied and the one 
with the lowest total is declared the winner.  The jurisdiction then wholly adopts the winning 
party’s platform.  The nations of Slovenia, Kiribati, and Nauru use the Borda Count in some of 
their political elections.  In the United States, the Borda Count is used to select the winner of the 
Heisman Trophy. 
Hare System.  In the Hare system, again voters rank candidate parties from 1 to m.  The 
votes are tallied and the candidate receiving the fewest first place votes is removed from 
consideration.  This process is repeated until only the winning candidate remains.  The 
jurisdiction then wholly adopts the winning party’s platform. 
Coombs System.  The Coombs system is similar to the Hare system, except that instead of 
removing the candidate with the fewest top ranked votes, the candidate ranked last by the most 
voters is removed.  This procedure is continued until only the winning party remains.  The 
jurisdiction then wholly adopts the winning party’s platform.  Various reality television shows 
that sequentially vote a contestant out of the competition at the end of each episode employ a 
modified form of the Coombs System.  It is a modified form because of the multiple votes cast 
and the passage of time between votes. 
Instant Runoff Majority Rule.  In the instant runoff majority rule system, all voters vote 
for their favorite party.  If any party receives more than half of the votes, they are declared the 
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winner.  If not, the top two parties then face each other in a run-off election.  As before, the 
jurisdiction then wholly adopts the winning party’s platform.  This decision rule is used in a 
number of municipal jurisdictions in the United States, to include San Francisco, California and 
Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
See Mueller (2003), especially Ch 7, for more on simple alternatives to majority rule. 
D.  Measures of Effectiveness 
In addition to the measures of effectiveness described above, we consider two 
alternatives intended to capture the amount of competition within jurisdictions.  One such 
measure is the minimum platform separation between parties competing within the same district, 
which we term intra-jurisdiction separation.  This metric is the Euclidean distance between the 
platform of the incumbent party and the platform of the closest alternative party within its 
jurisdiction (KMP 1998).  Consider it a loose surrogate for the incumbent’s ability to leverage its 
monopoly power.  An incumbent party whose closest challenger is relatively far away from 
finding a superior platform theoretically would be able to extract rent via overly high taxes much 
easier than an incumbent whose opposition is offering a very competitive platform, in terms of 
its location on the electoral landscape.   
Just as “number of firms” in a particular market is not sufficient, or in some respects even 
necessary, to determine the competitiveness of that market, neither is separation a perfect 
measure of the responsiveness of local governments to the interests of their constituents.  
However, the idea is to test the effectiveness with which various rules of collective decision 
making have in regards to enabling competing parties to narrow that gap.  In general, if an 
institution is consistently unable to allow multiple parties to converge at or near the optimum, 
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then that institution will be vulnerable to incumbent parties that are less responsive to the 
demands of voters. 
The other alternative we examine is the number of times during a simulation run that an 
incumbent loses an election.  Presumably, institutions within which incumbents have a higher 
probability of losing reelection are more responsive to voter’s needs.  In different instances 
below we present both total number of incumbent losses, as well as the probability an incumbent 
wins reelection, which is calculated from the former.   
 
E.  Results for the Extended Model 
 The purpose of this section is to gain insight into the sensitivity of KMP’s (1997) results 
with respect to voter preference landscapes.  A finding that the qualitative relationships hold, 
even while testing over a variety of landscapes, lends additional credibility to their conclusions.  
However, to discover exceptions to their findings provides a more nuanced understanding of the 
way in which local voting rules affect the efficiency with which individuals collectively acquire 
public goods.   
We vary institution, jurisdictions, voter ideology, and voter intensity in a full-factorial 
experimental design with levels outlined in Table 7.  The experiment consists of 336 design 
points, which we replicate 50 times each for a total of 16,800 runs.  As above in the replication 
section, we employ common random numbers to the greatest extent possible in order to reduce 
the variance between design points and improve statistical power.   
 
Table 7.  Full Factorial Experimental Design 
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The parameters held constant during this experiment are shown in Table 8.  Since issue 
levels are integers, they can take on integer values between 0 and 8.  Similarly, intensity can take 
on integer values on the closed set [0,2].  The factor levels in Table 8 were selected due to their 
proximity to the factors levels in KMP (1998).  The duration of each simulation run is 30 
timesteps, in contrast to 10 in KMP (1997) because the dynamics of the model, given the richer 
electoral landscapes of preferences, were such that equilibrium is not always attained in 10 
timesteps.  For the results presented, the response variables are all at time t=30. 
 
Table 8.  Parameters held constant in experiment 
Institution Jurisdictions Ideology Intensity
Democratic Referenda 1 Consistent Random
Direct competition (2 parties) 3 Uniform Centrist
Direct competition (3 parties) 7 Extremist
Direct competiton (7 parties) 11
Proportional representation (3 parties)
Proportional representation (7 parties)
Borda count (3 parties)
Borda count (7 parties)
Coombs system (3 parties)
Coombs system (7 parties)
Hare system (3 parties)
Hare system (7 parties)
Majority runoff (3 parties)
Majority runoff (7 parties)




1. Single Jurisdiction 
 The results for the single jurisdiction model are shown in Table 9.  Recall that utility is 
the negative weighted Euclidean distance between an agent’s ideal platform and the platform 
offered in her jurisdiction.  The means shown are the overall mean per-capita utilities achieved 
by the particular institution.  We conduct a one-way ANOVA on the effect of the institution 
while blocking on the effects of the six different landscapes.  We use the Tukey-Kramer multiple 
comparison technique (Tukey 1953; Kramer 1956) to then determine which, if any, institutions 
generate statistically significant differences at a 0.05 level of significance.    In the tables, the 
levels that do not share a letter are significantly different.  For example, that fact that democratic 
referenda and two-party direct competition share an “A” indicates that the two levels are not 
significantly different.  However, seven-party proportional representation is assigned a “B”, 
which indicates it is significantly different than democratic referenda. 
 
Table 9.  Single Jurisdiction; Per-capita Utility after 30 elections. 
Description Factor Level
Number of issues under consideration Number Issues 10
Maximum preference level for issue Issue Range 8
Maximum intensity strength for issue Intensity Range 2
Maximum distance from ideal point Variance Range 1
Number of cycles for adaptive parties Campaign Length 8
Number of adaptive iterations per cycle Campaign Iterations 5
Issues to perterb in campaign cycle Perterb Issues 3




 Table 9 confirms that the order between the institutions for the single jurisdiction case is 
nearly identical to that of KMP (1997).  The only difference is that seven-party proportional 
representation is slightly higher than three-party proportional representation.  This order is based 
on the overall means for each treatment (institution).  It is possible that the particular 
performance of each institution relative to the others may depend on the landscape of voter 
preferences.  Table 10 outlines the per-capita utility (at time 30) for each institution and its 
relative ranking by landscape. 
  
Table 10.  Single Jurisdiction; Per-capita Utility after 30 elections by preference landscape. 
(Within-block rank in parantheses.) 
 
 
Referenda has the highest per-capita utility for each landscape, while seven-party direct 
competition has the lowest for each.  Most other deviations from the order presented in Table 10 
Institution Mean
Democratic referenda A -73.30
Direct competition (2 parties) A B -76.34
Proportional representation (7 parties) B -78.30
Rroportional representation (3 parties) C -86.10
Direct competition (3 parties) C -88.89
Direct competition (7 parties) D -121.74
Levels not connected by same letter are significantly different.
1 Jurisdiction
Random Centrist Extremist Random Centrist Extremist
Institution Strengths Strengths Strengths Strengths Strengths Strengths
Democratic referenda -66.69    (1)  -33.33    (1)  -122.42  (1)  -63.91    (1)  -36.66    (1)  -116.79  (1)
Direct competition (2 parties) -69.51    (2)  -34.65    (4)  -126.69  (2)  -66.37    (2)  -39.47    (2)  -121.34  (2)
Proportional representation (7 parties) -70.90    (4)  -34.35    (2)  -128.79  (3)  -68.48    (3)  -40.10    (3)  -127.21  (3)
Rroportional representation (3 parties) -70.56    (3)  -34.37    (3)  -128.99  (4)  -81.79    (4)  -54.80    (4)  -146.06  (4)
Direct competition (3 parties) -72.18    (5)  -35.15    (5)  -133.31  (5)  -85.90    (5)  -57.67    (5)  -149.11  (5)
Direct competition (7 parties) -81.62    (6)  -37.14    (6)  -150.50  (6) -141.54   (6) -100.16   (6)  -219.45  (6)
1 Jurisdiction Uniform Ideology Consistent Ideology
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(above) are slight.  For example, two-party direct competition is ranked 2nd, as it is in Table 10, 
in all but one landscape.  Also of note, landscapes with centrist intensities tend to yield higher 
per-capita utility levels, while extremist intensities are achieve dramatically lower levels. 
 In the single jurisdiction scenario, the rank-order of the aggregate performance of the 
voting institutions closely resembles that of KMP (1997).  Closer inspection of the relative 
performance of the institutions over each landscape reveals that this ordering holds with only 
minor exceptions.  Thus, we firmly conclude that the original findings with respect to the single 
jurisdiction case are robust across a wide-range of possible voter preference landscapes. 
 
2.  Multiple Jurisdictions 
 In this section, we consider additional jurisdictions.  As in KMP, we observe that the 
availability of additional jurisdictions tends to increase aggregate utility, due to the ability of 
voters to sort themselves into more homogeneous constituencies.  The results for the multiple 
jurisdiction scenarios are displayed in Table 11. 
 
Table 11. Multiple Jurisdictions; Per-capita Utility after 30 elections. 
 
 
Recall that KMP find proportional representation to be superior to the other voting rules in all 
multiple jurisdiction cases.  We find that two-party direct competition is superior for three 
jurisdictions, but democratic referenda returns to the top in the seven and eleven jurisdiction 
Institution
Democratic referenda B -59.67 A -31.02 A -26.17
Proportional representation (7 parties) A -39.58 A -31.01 B -27.54
Proportional representation (3 parties) A -39.41 A -31.38 C -28.71
Direct competition (2 parties) A -39.29 B -32.63 D -29.85
Levels not connected by same letter are significantly different.
11 Jurisdictions3 Jurisdictions 7 Jurisdictions
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cases.  Though the difference between the top voting rules and three-party proportional 
representation is not statistically significant in the three and seven jurisdiction cases, as we 
increase the number of jurisdictions to eleven and beyond, the differences among the each 
institution becomes statistically significant.   
 While the relationship between preference landscape and the voting institution that 
achieves the highest utility is unclear at three jurisdictions, as the number of jurisdictions 
increases to eleven, a more robust pattern emerges.  Table 12 outlines the per-capita utility for 
each voting institution and eleven jurisdictions. It shows the relationship in which democratic 
referenda achieves the highest per-capita utility, followed closely by seven-party proportional 
representation, is consistent across preference landscapes. 
 
Table 12. Eleven Jurisdictions; Per-capita Utility after 30 elections, by preference landscape.  
(Within-block rank in parentheses) 
 
  
For multiple jurisdictions (namely, greater than three), we find that the superior voting 
rule with respect to achieving the highest per-capita utility is democratic referenda.  In contrast, 
KMP find that proportional representation is superior.  One possible symptom of proportional 
representation’s relatively poorer performance is illustrated in Figure 1.   
 
Random Centrist Extremist Random Centrist Extremist
Institution Strengths Strengths Strengths Strengths Strengths Strengths
Democratic referenda -37.80    (1) -24.92    (2) -72.64    (1) -6.14     (1) -6.63     (1) -8.87     (2)
Proportional representation (7 parties) -39.93    (2) -24.83    (1) -77.11    (2) -6.89     (2) -7.77     (2) -8.68     (1)
Proportional representation (3 parties) -41.05    (3) -25.95    (3) -78.01    (3) -7.38     (3) -8.66     (3) -11.22   (4)
Direct competition (2 parties) -42.90    (4) -27.23    (4) -81.24    (4) -8.14     (4) -9.75     (4) -9.85     (3)








Figure 1 shows the average number of agent relocations tallied in each 10 time-step 
segment of the simulation run in the three jurisdiction scenario.  All voting institutions 
experience a large number of relocations in the first ten time-steps of the simulation.  However, 
by the 30th time-step, the average number of moves is very low for democratic referenda, two-
party direct competition, and three-party direct competition; while three and seven-party 
proportional representation and seven-party direct competition show little sign of convergence 
after even 60 time-steps.  While a large number of relocations are necessary early in a simulation 
run in order to facilitate sorting, proportional representation, as an institution, appears to have 
trouble coping with the complexity of the preference landscapes.   
 KMP’s (1997) overarching conclusion concerning the stability of the electoral process 



























Direct competition (2 parties)
Proportional representation (3 parties)
Proportional representation (7 parties)
Democratic referenda
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conclusions regarding the relative performance of collective decision making rules is clearly not 
robust over various electoral landscapes.  While it is ultimately an empirical question as to 
whether the voters’ preferences in a particular set of jurisdictions conform to one or more of the 
electoral landscapes considered in this model, further investigation of the link between electoral 
landscape will likely yield interesting results. 
 
3.  Measures of Competition 
 A number of researchers, to include Epple (1981) and Caplan (2001), model local 
governments as monopolists who leverage their power to tax to extract rents from the public.  
Both of these models assume full and complete information on the part of local government, 
such that the exact tax rate to charge, the amount of rent to extract, and the potential detrimental 
effect upon probability of reelection is simply the outcome of an optimization.  Caplan imposes a 
separation effect between parties by using a party preference parameter (2001: 8).  In the present 
model, parties do not have full information regarding the distribution of voter preferences.  They 
must adaptively search the issue space for platforms they expect will beat their opponents and 
attract constituents.  Thus, parties that arrive in the vicinity of the highest portion of the electoral 
landscape may maintain their position as incumbent for some time.  We examine the intra-
jurisdiction separation between the incumbent party and the next best challenger as a possible 
measure of intensity of competition within the jurisdiction.  
Table 13 shows the average minimum intra-jurisdiction separations in each scenario.  
Direct competition is relatively less effective with respect to separation than the other voting 
institutions.  In contrast, proportional representation is superior to the other institutions in this 
regard.  The institutions that generally tend to most efficiently improve utility are also the same 
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institutions that encourage low levels of separation.  This relationship is especially true as the 
number of jurisdictions increase and is relatively robust across electoral landscapes. 
 
Table 13. Intra-Jurisdiction Separation. (relative rank in parentheses) 
 
 
 An incumbent party that successfully leverages its position may enjoy some electoral 
distance between its position and its rivals, but this only matters to the extent that this distance 
enables the party to maintain its incumbent position.  Table 14 outlines the probability that an 
incumbent loses a given election in a given jurisdiction, for a particular voting institution.  We 
find that proportional representation offers incumbent parties the least protection, while two-
party direct competition tends to offer the most protection6. 
 
Table 14. Probability of Incumbent Reelection (Per Jurisdiction, Per Election) 
 
6 For proportional representation the incumbent party is the party with the most votes. 
1 3 7 11
Institution jurisdiction jurisdictions jurisdictions jurisdictions
Proportional representation (7 parties) 2.26   (1) 2.83   (1) 3.30   (1) 3.70   (1)
Direct competition (7 parties) 4.47   (3) 3.57   (3) 3.77   (2) 4.21   (2)
Proportional representation (3 parties) 5.32   (4) 3.36   (2) 4.25   (3) 4.91   (3)
Direct competition (3 parties) 6.79   (5) 3.81   (4) 4.38   (4) 5.12   (4)
Direct competition (2 parties) 3.41   (2) 4.00   (5) 5.12   (5) 5.97   (5)
** All  within-jurisdiction differences are statistically signficant at 0.05 level of significance.
Intra-Jurisdiction Party Platform Separation
1 3 7 11
Institution jurisdiction jurisdictions jurisdictions jurisdictions
Proportional representation (7 parties)  0.568   (1)  0.656   (1)  0.755   (1)  0.799   (1)
Proportional representation (3 parties)  0.787   (5)  0.767   (3)  0.849   (2)  0.880   (2)
Direct competition (7 parties)  0.568   (1)  0.760   (2)  0.862   (3)  0.893   (3)
Direct competition (3 parties)  0.787   (5)  0.822   (4)  0.884   (4)  0.911   (4)
Direct competition (2 parties)  0.754   (3)  0.830   (5)  0.889   (5)  0.914   (5)
Probability of Incumbent Reelection
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In this section, we endogenously generate the sort of separation that Caplan (2001) shows 
is sufficient to allow local governments to leverage monopoly power over their constituents 
despite the pressure from Tiebout competition.  We find that the relative performances of the 
different voting rules with respect to separation mirror their performances with respect to 
probability of incumbent reelection and we find that while the institutions differ in their 
performance in regard to this measure, the conclusions are not robust over parameter choices 
such as the number of jurisdictions.  Further investigation is required in order to determine the 
full extent of the usefulness of this metric. 
 
4.  Additional Voting Rules 
 Agent-Based Computational Models provide a unique opportunity to experiment with 
various social institutions in ways that would be impossible or infeasible in reality.  One way we 
leverage this model is to test the performance of a number of alternative voting rules which are 
rarely employed in practice at the level of governance we consider in this project.  Table 15 
outlines the performance of all voting rules in the single jurisdiction instance.  We find that the 
alternative rules neither perform as well as the best rules that KMP considers nor perform as 
poorly as the worst.   
 
Table 15. Single Jurisdiction; Per-Capita Utility; Alternative Voting Rules 
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This single jurisdiction case is an important relative assessment of these rules.  While 
other researchers have assessed them with regard to metrics such as Condorcet efficiency (see 
Merrill (1984; 1985), none have assessed their performance with regard to aggregate utility using 
voters with such complex preference structures. 
 As we increase the number of jurisdictions a pattern emerges in which the alternative 
rules settle in on the lower positions of the list.  Ultimately, we are unable to find a voting rule-
jurisdiction-landscape combination in which an alternative voting rule is either the best or worst 
rule, in terms of per-capita utility.  
 The alternative voting rules fare better when considering intra-jurisdiction separation.  
Table 16 shows the relative performance of all institutions in the eleven jurisdiction case.  There 
is a distinct division in that all seven-party institutions are superior to those with three or fewer.    
 
Institution Mean
Democratic referenda A -73.30
Direct competition (2 parties) A B -76.34
Proportional representation (7 parties) B C -78.30
Borda count (3 parties) B C -79.38
Coombs system (3 parties) C D -81.09
Coombs system (7 parties) C D -81.51
Borda count (7 parties) C D -81.86
Hare system (3 parties) D E -84.23
Majority runoff (3 parties) D E -84.60
Proportional representation (3 parties) E F -86.10
Direct competition (3 parties) F -88.89
Hare system (7 parties) G -98.16
Majority runoff (7 parties) G -99.76
Direct competition (7 parties) H -121.74
Levels not connected by same letter are significantly different.
1 Jurisdiction
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Table 16.  Eleven jurisdictions; Mean Minimum Intra-Jurisdiction Separation.
 
 
 Finally, we examine the extent to which incumbent parties are likely to remain in power 
under various voting rules.  Table 17 shows the estimated probability that the incumbent party in 
any particular jurisdiction will be reelected in any particular election.   
 
Institution Mean
Proportional representation (7 parties) A 3.70
Coombs system (7 parties) B 4.02
Hare system (7 parties) B 4.04
Borda count (7 parties) B 4.04
Majority runoff (7 parties) B C 4.08
Direct competition (7 parties) C 4.21
Proportional representation (3 parties) D 4.91
Hare system (3 parties) D 4.94
Borda count (3 parties) D 4.94
Majority runoff (3 parties) D 4.95
Coombs system (3 parties) D 4.96
Direct competition (3 parties) E 5.12
Direct competition (2 parties) F 5.97
Levels not connected by same letter are significantly different.
11 Jurisdictions
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Table 17  Eleven Jurisdictions; Per Election Per Jurisdiction Probability of Incumbent Reelection
 
 
With the exception of seven-party majority runoff, all alternative rules under consideration 
exhibit the highest levels of incumbent reelection probability.  Thus, of the standard voting rules 
KMP considers, those that allow greater separation between the platform of the incumbent party 
and the next best challenger also allow greater protection to incumbents in terms of reelection 
probability.  In contrast, we find that the alternative rules achieve lower levels of separation 
between parties, yet actually offer more protection to incumbents.  While extant voting rules 
have deficiencies, the evidence suggests that these simple alternatives may have their own 
deficiencies as well. 
 
V.  The Extended Model Exhibits Low Sensitivity to Arbitrary Parameter Values 
In the years since KMP developed and analyzed their models, computing power has 
grown exponentially.  In addition, the state of the art of simulation analysis pushed forward by 
researchers working the operations research field of data farming, has also improved 
Institution Mean
Proportional representation (7 parties) A 0.799
Proportional representation (3 parties) B 0.880
Direct competition (7 parties) C 0.893
Direct competition (3 parties) D 0.911
Majority runoff (7 parties) D E 0.912
Direct competition (2 parties) D E F 0.914
Majority runoff (3 parties) D E F G 0.918
Coombs system (3 parties) E F G 0.918
Borda count (3 parties) E F G 0.919
Hare system (7 parties) E F G 0.919
Coombs system (7 parties) F G 0.920
Hare system (3 parties) F G 0.920
Borda count (7 parties) G 0.921
Levels not connected by same letter are significantly different.
11 Jurisdictions
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substantially7.  We leverage both in this section in order gain further insight into the robustness 
of our conclusions.   
We examine a total of thirteen factors.  The factors include important qualitative 
variables such as voting institution and preference landscape that we examine above, but also 
simulation parameters such as the number of issues or the number of campaign iterations that are 
essentially arbitrary.  A full factorial analysis of the factors listed in Table 18 requires 
97,977,600 design points.  Alternatively, a Nearly Orthogonal and Balanced (NOB) Latin 
Hypercube design accommodates both continuous and categorical variables, and only requires 
512 design points (Viera, et al, 2011).  We replicate each design point 20 times for a total of 
10,240 runs.  The design achieves near-orthogonality of the factors, which improves the power 
of the statistical analysis, while requiring only a fraction of the design points for a full-factorial 
analysis8.   
 
Table 18. Experimental Design 
 
7 For more information on data farming, to include research papers, tutorials, and spreadsheets, see 
<harvest.nps.edu>. 
8 The maximum pairwise correlation between any two factors in our design is 0.0233.   
Description Factor Type Levels Values
Number of voters in polity voters continuous [1000, 5000]
Number of jurisdictions in system jurisdictions continuous [1,20]
Number of political parties per jurisdiction parties categorical 9 [2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10]
Number of issues under consideration numberIssues continuous [8, 24]
Maximum distance from ideal point varianceRange categorical 3 [0, 1, 2]
Maximum preference level for issue issueRange categorical 5 [4,6,8,10,12]
Maximum intensity strength for issue intensityRange categorical 4 [1,2,3,4]
Number of cycles for adaptive parties campaignLength categorical 9 [4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12]
Number of adaptive iterations per cycle campaignIterations categorical 10 [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9.10]
Proportion of voters polled pollProp categorical 3 [0.1, 0.7, 1.0]
Issues to perterb in campaign cycle perterbIssues categorical 2 [0.2, 0.5]
Preference Landscapes landscape categorical 6 [0,1,2,3,4,5]
Voting rule employed in system instituiton categorical 7 [0,1,2,3,4,5,6]
Nearly Orthogonal and Balanced Latin Hypercube Experimental Design
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  We examine the response variables per-capita utility; minimum intra-jurisdiction 
separation; agent relocations; and incumbent losses, and fit an Ordinary Least Squares 
Regression meta-model with main effects to the each of the response surfaces.  The coefficient 
estimates are shown in Table 19.  Note that the separation model and the incumbent losses model 









Term Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Intercept -46.87 <.0001 4.58 <.0001 -2840.67 0.010 3.94 0.506
jurisdictions 1.65 <.0001 ** 0.07 <.0001 ** 118.79 <.0001 ** 1.85 <.0001 **
parties -0.05 0.827 -0.12 <.0001 ** 183.92 0.0007 ** 1.70 <.0001 **
voters 0.00 0.238 0.00 <.0001 ** 1.95 <.0001 ** 0.00 0.014
institution[borda] 3.00 0.071 * 0.10 0.077 * -693.81 0.0514 * -7.88 <.0001 **
institution[coombs] 0.30 0.856 0.03 0.644 -1389.59 <.0001 ** -10.86 <.0001 **
institution[direct comp] 2.59 0.089 * 0.13 0.020 * 819.96 0.012 * -0.32 0.844
institution[hare] 0.46 0.778 -0.06 0.281 -1236.89 0.000 ** -8.73 <.0001 **
institution[maj runoff] -3.14 0.052 * 0.15 0.007 * -101.40 0.769 -5.66 0.001 *
institution[prop rep] 3.86 0.013 * -0.35 <.0001 ** 5233.29 <.0001 ** 33.44 <.0001 **
institution[referenda] -7.07 <.0001 ** -2631.57 <.0001 **
landscape[unif -indep] -12.06 <.0001 ** 0.78 <.0001 ** -409.12 0.175 -10.33 <.0001 **
landscape[unif - cent] 8.11 <.0001 ** -0.08 0.145 -1843.95 <.0001 ** -20.56 <.0001 **
landscape[unif - ext] -52.78 <.0001 ** 1.29 <.0001 ** 1972.52 <.0001 ** 4.63 0.001 *
landscape[consist - indep] 20.93 <.0001 ** -0.90 <.0001 ** 251.10 0.434 5.70 0.001 *
landscape[consist - cent] 22.41 <.0001 ** -0.62 <.0001 ** 587.17 0.068 * 11.86 <.0001 **
landscape[consist - ext] 13.39 <.0001 ** -0.47 <.0001 ** -557.72 0.064 * 8.70 <.0001 **
numberIssues 0.05 0.734 0.00 0.774 3.10 0.917 0.17 0.302
intensityRange -0.10 0.864 -0.05 0.048 * -68.37 0.587 -0.33 0.635
varianceRange -1.02 0.200 0.01 0.858 -44.53 0.795 0.26 0.781
issueRange -0.19 0.378 -0.02 0.037 * -51.13 0.277 -0.15 0.559
campaignLength 0.10 0.688 0.00 0.832 -3.52 0.948 -0.33 0.260
campaignIterations 0.04 0.853 0.02 0.060 * 104.45 0.026 * 0.14 0.594
perterbIssues -0.07 0.121 0.00 0.428 4.40 0.631 0.00 0.921






E [per capita utility] E[separation] E[moves] E[incumbent losses]
0.781 0.696
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The meta-models confirm that statistically significant relationships exist between the 
response variables and factors such as voting institution, preference landscape, and jurisdictions.  
More importantly for the present task, the models confirm that relatively few statistically 
significant relationships exist between basic model parameters (the lowest group of factors in 
Table 19) and the response variables.  For example, none of the basic model parameters are 
statistically significant in either the per-capita utility model or the incumbent losses model.  
Thus, we conclude the qualitative findings with respect to per-capita utility and incumbent losses 
fleshed out in the previous section are relatively insensitive to arbitrary decisions such as how to 
specifically model voter preferences such as the number of issues, issue range, and intensity 
range or the mechanics of the electoral campaign.   
 The regression model for intra-jurisdiction separation contains the following statistically 
significant factors: intensity range, issue range, and campaign iterations.  It makes sense that 
issue range is a statistically significant determinant of separation, since greater issue ranges 
would conceivably allow for larger separations between competing parties.  The notion that a 
parameter like campaign iterations may affect inter-jurisdiction separation and agent-relocations 
is also intuitively consistent, since campaign iterations is theoretically correlated with how hard 
political parties work to find those areas of the policy domain space that increase utility and win 
elections.  Ultimately, we confirm that the majority of the otherwise arbitrary simulation 
parameters tend not to affect our response variables, thus suggesting that the results discussed in 
Section V are relatively insensitive to changes in model parameters.  
 
VI.  Conclusion  
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 Agent-based simulation is a relatively new tool in the social sciences, and it was more 
recently introduced to the field of political economy.  The model we present in this paper applies 
this modeling technique in an attempt to gain insight into the efficiencies with which political 
institutions are able to sort voters by preferences.  The technique shows potential for more 
rigorous analysis of political, fiscal, and economic competition on the part of local governments 
in the future.  Our successful replication of a seminal model provides interested researchers with 
the means to pursue such interests. 
The most convincing finding in our analysis of the extended model is that the conclusion 
drawn by KMP (1997) regarding the relative efficiencies of voting institutions in the single 
jurisdiction scenario is highly robust.  However, when we consider multiple jurisdictions, the 
results are far less clear.  As the number of jurisdictions increase a stable pattern emerges, but it 
is one where democratic referenda is the most efficient, rather than proportional representation as 
in KMP (1997).  We find that for the standard voting rules, intra-jurisdiction separation and 
probability of incumbent reelection are directly related.  Thus, those institutions that enable 
incumbent parties to achieve greater separation from their closest rival also protect those 
incumbent parties more from electoral competition.   
 We also consider some alternative voting rules, such as the Borda Count, Hare Count, 
Coombs System, and Instant Run-off Majority Rule.  We find little evidence to suggest that any 
of the alternative voting rules we consider achieve greater voter satisfaction or improve the 
competitiveness of local elections.  In fact, we find that the alternative rules all improve 
incumbents’ chances for reelection, relative to the other voting rules.   
 Finally, we demonstrate a technique for conducting sensitivity analyses that leverages a 
high-dimensional experimental design.  Our design requires only 512 design points in contrast to 
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the 99 million required for a similarly rigorous full-factorial design.  The Ordinary Least Squares 
meta-models constructed from the response surfaces reveal that our conclusions are relatively 
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